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Some Modest Uses of Transnational
Legal Perspectives in First-Year
Constitutional Law
Neil S. Siegel

Introduction
To be clear, I write and teach about U.S. constitutional law. I am not a
comparative constitutional lawyer, nor do I aspire to be one at this point. In
light of how I teach my students, however, I may be appropriately situated to
contribute to a conversation on integrating transnational legal perspectives
into the introductory course in constitutional law. Increasingly, even professors who remain focused on U.S. constitutional law incorporate transnational
legal perspectives in their instruction.
In this essay, I identify several uses of transnational perspectives in firstyear constitutional law: (1) comparing American constitutional arrangements to those in other countries; (2) teaching international law and foreign
legal experiences when relevant to U.S. litigation in the “war on terror”;
and (3) examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s invocations of foreign legal
practices. I illustrate these uses with examples from doctrinal areas that I
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1.

Because the terminology can be unclear and even conceptually unstable, I want to clarify
what kinds of law I mean by the term “transnational legal perspectives.” I understand transnational law to encompass the law of other nations, the law governing cross-border legal
matters (which is sometimes incorporated into domestic legal norms), public international
law, and anything else “legal” that might be relevant to transactions involving contacts between at least two nations. Transnational law is conceptually distinct from “non-U.S. law,”
which is used as shorthand for everything “legal” that has not been incorporated into domestic U.S. law. See the discussion of the Supreme Court’s invocations of foreign legal
practices; see generally Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 St. Louis U. L. J. 671 (2005). Non-U.S.
law includes most of what is called transnational law, but not all of it.
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cover in my course. While each use serves a distinct pedagogical purpose,
cumulatively they underscore the increasing importance of transnational legal perspectives in U.S. constitutional law. I conclude, however, with a cautionary note. Selectivity and modesty are warranted, I suggest, because the
course appropriately focuses on the United States, teaching time is scarce,
coverage tradeoffs abound, the subject matter is complex, and one cannot
easily construct transnational examples that are both intellectually serious
and pedagogically tractable.
Comparisons to Practices in Other Countries
Comparing constitutional practices in the United States with those elsewhere gives students the sense that the American constitutional structure is
neither inevitable nor necessarily best. Such comparisons can stimulate discussions about which approaches to constitutional questions are most desirable in particular institutional and cultural contexts, and can also encourage
students to question why one approach was adopted in the United States but
not another. In making such comparisons to other nations, students gain a
sense of the great extent to which constitutional provisions are a product of
the time, circumstances, and culture in which they are adopted. For example,
other nations do not have anything like the Third Amendment, nor would the
United States if the Constitution were written today or if the British had not
engaged in the practice that the amendment proscribes.
Separation of Powers
In the area of separation of powers, I draw from foreign legal experience
in teaching Marbury v. Madison and judicial review. In my experience, many
students come to law school believing that U.S.-style judicial supremacy is
a logical entailment of a written constitution that imposes meaningful limits
on the exercise of government power. Alexander Hamilton’s defense of judicial review in Federalist 78 and Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v.
Madison solidify—and may be partly responsible for—this impression. I have
2.

Students at Duke Law School take the basic 4.5-credit course in Constitutional Law during their first year. My course covers separation of powers, federalism, incorporation, state
action, substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection. When time
permits, I also teach the power of Congress to authorize private suits against states.

3.

The Third Amendment provides that “[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to
be prescribed by law.” U.S. Const. amend. III. I reference the Third Amendment at the
beginning of my course as an example of the historical contingency of constitutional provisions. The Amendment does not reappear until my students encounter Justice Douglas’
controversial opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as
we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy… .” (citation omitted)).
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found that I can motivate students to think critically about the functional
advisability of judicial supremecy, as opposed to its self-evident inevitability
or logical necessity, by stressing that few other democracies in the world have
high courts with as much authority to resolve constitutional questions as the
U.S. Supreme Court.
To be sure, use of transnational perspectives is not essential if one wants
to encourage students to question U.S.-style judicial review. One could simply interrogate Alexander Hamilton’s and Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning—and that of the students who endorse it reflexively. Both Hamilton and
the great Chief Justice beg the question of who decides whether a particular
government action comports with the Constitution when the legislature and
the courts disagree on this question. Neither explains why his reasoning does
not apply with equal force when the U.S. Supreme Court decides the scope of
its own power—as in Marbury itself, when the Court declared that it possessed
the awesome power of judicial review.
But the transnational dimension constitutes a useful supplement to rigorous analysis of foundational reasoning. Exposure to the practices of other nations tends to free students up to think critically about American institutions.
The idea that “it couldn’t be otherwise” becomes more difficult to sustain if, in
fact, it is otherwise elsewhere.
One might question the need to look abroad if the purpose is to unsettle the
normative power of the actual in the minds of students. One could also look
back, using U.S. constitutional history as a source of comparisons. For much
4.

Canada, Germany, South Africa, and Hungary have high courts that exercise robust powers of judicial review in constitutional cases. Regarding the Hungarian experience, see
Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 E. Eur. Const. Rev.
81 (Fall 1999) (discussing the Court’s practice of holding that parliament was acting “unconstitutionally by omission” by failing to pass certain legislation); Donald L. Horowitz,
Constitutional Courts: Issues for Iraq (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing various ways in which “[t]he Hungarian Constitutional Court has been
unusually aggressive”).

5.

Mark Tushnet offers a useful example: “[T]he Canadian ‘notwithstanding’ mechanism…
allows a legislature to override specific constitutional provisions by majority vote, in legislation that sunsets after five years, a period that necessarily encompasses an election in which
the voters can decide whether they approve of the legislature’s action.” Tushnet, How (and
How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 675.

6.

See Horowitz, Constitutional Courts, supra note 4 (“Constitutional courts are important,
but not always indispensable, features of constitutional government. Britain developed a
constitutional regime without judicial review of legislation or governmental action for its
constitutionality. Parliamentary supremacy did not produce an illiberal regime. Switzerland
has had relatively little judicial review and still has no separate constitutional court. Yet there
are few more vibrantly liberal democratic countries in the world.”).

7.

See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 71 (1965) (“There indeed exists what Felix Cohen characterized as ‘the normative power of the actual’: that which is law tends by its very existence
to generate a sense of being also that which ought to be the law.”).
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of the existence of the United States as a nation, for example, the Supreme
Court was not nearly as powerful an institution as it is today.
History plays an important role in a constitutional law course. But transnational perspectives and historical comparisons are not mutually exclusive
alternatives. And the key point for my current purposes is that transnational
outlooks can sometimes unsettle the preconceptions of students more effectively
than U.S. history can.
Certain aspects of American history are significantly more foreign to contemporary American students than are the practices of many modern countries—so much so that invoking American history might serve only to reinforce
the normative power of current constitutional arrangements in this country.
Students might wonder why they should care that early nineteenth-century
Americans lived with a relatively weak Supreme Court when they also owned
slaves and did not allow women to vote. Because modern Europeans are much
more “like us,” their having different structures and extents of judicial review is
more salient. In my experience, students intuitively tend to view the world and
American history this way, so that the “it wasn’t always this way” point about
the historical contingency of constitutional practices falls on relatively deaf
ears, while the submission that “it isn’t this way everywhere” has more force.
Federalism
There is another reason why transnational outlooks can prove more effective than U.S. history in unsettling the preconceptions of students. Looking
to American history can be of limited usefulness in reaching students who
identify certain structural arrangements with particular ideological commitments. For example, some students view the supposed “virtues” of federalism
or “states’ rights” as necessarily a euphemism for the law and politics of racial
apartheid. Switching venues to, say, the European Union, can depoliticize the
issue, facilitating a functional, normative analysis of the various potential roles
of states in a federal system.
When my course turns to federalism, I compare the U.S. Supreme Court’s
view of commandeering with that of the European Union and Germany. The
general view of member states of the European Union on commandeering is the
opposite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s position: member states tend to prefer
8.

Cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S., Speech at the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006) (transcript available at <http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html> (last visited Sept. 21,
2006). (“The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I have urged, if we do not both share
our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to
our own.” (emphasis added)).

9.

The concern here is with student bias, not with an actual paucity of forceful examples in
U.S. history that belie the identification of federalism with racism. See, e.g., Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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directives, which “command a Member State to regulate in a particular area and
thus require further Member State legislative action to become fully effective
within that state,” to regulations, which “have immediate legal force for individuals within a Member State.”10 Among other things,11 the general European
judgment is that directives leave member states with more regulatory power.12
In a relatively rare instance of comparative analysis on the U.S. Supreme Court,
Justice Breyer flagged this perceived virtue of commandeering on the other side
of the Atlantic:
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that
local control is better maintained through application of a principle that is
the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the silence of
our Constitution. The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or
decrees enacted by the central “federal” body… . They do so in part because
they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent
authority of the “state,” member nation, or other subsidiary government, and
helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.13

Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declined Justice Breyer’s invitation to
10.

Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European
Union (Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse eds., New York, 2001) [hereinafter The Issue of Commandeering] (“In the European Union, by contrast [to the United States], the
subject of concern is not Union action that ‘commandeers’ Member State legislative or administrative bodies, but EU legislative activity that has direct effect in the legal systems of
the Member States. Member States tend not to welcome Community regulations, which
have immediate legal force for individuals within a Member State, and instead prefer that
the Community pass directives, which command a Member State to regulate in a particular
area and thus require further Member State legislative action to become fully effective within
that state. So, too, ‘commandeering’ is a basic feature of German federalism… .”) (footnote
omitted). See also Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality
of Federal Systems, 90 Va. L. Rev. 731, 800, 801 (2004) [hereinafter Of Power and Responsibility] (arguing that the Tenth Amendment decisions “stand in striking contrast to the
analogous doctrines of the European Court of Justice,” and exploring some of the “reasons
for welcoming ‘commandeering’ in the European Union but not in the United States”).

11.

In addition to the issue of regulatory control discussed in the text, Halberstam stresses that
“the United States Supreme Court treats the various levels of government as permanently
hostile adversaries that have reached a bargain in a historically situated arms-length deal,
whereas the European Court of Justice views the various actors as fundamentally joined in a
common enterprise.” Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility, supra note 10, at 801.

12.

Technically, both directives and regulations qualify as forms of “commandeering” under U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine—specifically, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)—because
most regulations in the European Union must be enforced by member-state institutions.
See, e.g., Halberstam, The Issue of Commandeering, supra note 10, at 213. Note, moreover,
that even if one were to dispute Professor Halberstam’s empirical judgment about the preferences of member states, the key conceptual point would remain that both directives and
regulations are clearly legal in the European Union.

13.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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look abroad, deeming “such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution.”14
Dabbling in comparative law by contrasting legal regimes briefly and at
a high level of abstraction does not position Justices, let alone students, to
offer definitive conclusions about the wisdom of current Tenth Amendment
doctrine. Justice Breyer rightly recognized that “we are interpreting our own
Constitution, and not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own.”15 Indeed,
Daniel Halberstam’s analysis of the institutional dynamics in the United
States and European Union helps to account for their opposite approaches
to commandeering:
The US anti-commandeering rule exists in the context of a federal system
marked by independently constituted, independently competent levels of
governance that coexist…with a powerful federal government whose sphere
of influence has proven difficult to contain by other means. Here, the anticommandeering rule may be viewed as a consensus-forcing device by separating independent tiers of governance and requiring federal and State decision
makers to reach agreement before working together.16

According to Halberstam, the legal and political culture in Europe is
markedly different:
[T]he EU and Germany have both preserved…limitations on central government expansion and mechanisms of component State control over central
government norms. Constitutional provisions and practical realities in both
the EU and Germany make the central governing structure in both systems
dependent on the component States for administrative services. And in both
systems, component States are represented in their corporate capacities in
the central governing institutions. Thus, in the EU and in Germany, commandeering is embedded within a system of consensus-forcing governance
with structural limitations on the expansion of the central government….
[C]ommandeering may be viewed as a further mechanism to maintain the
dependence of the central government on the component States and to preserve a sphere for additional component State input while carrying out central
commands.17

The political safeguards of federalism are more present in Europe than they
are here.
Moreover, the directive in European Union law (1) refers only to commandeered legislation, not to executive action, as was at issue in Printz; (2) is specifically
provided for in the European Union Treaty; (3) is the only available instrument
14.

Id. at 921 n.11.

15.

Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

16.

Halberstam, Comparative Federalism, supra note 10, at 249-50 (footnote omitted).

17.

Id.
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in some areas; and (4) is partly justified by the very different doctrinal structures
that characterize the legal regimes of member states. Directives enable them to
realize given policy goals in a variety of legal systems, a concern less relevant
in the United States because differences among state laws are more substantive
and less doctrinal (perhaps excepting Louisiana).18
Accordingly, there exists a stronger textual basis for legislative commandeering in the European Union than in the United States and a greater need
for state-level flexibility. Such wrinkles, however, do not appear to detract
from Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the European “experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem.”19 Halberstam’s examination of commandeering in
Europe seems to corroborate Justice Breyer’s conclusion that commandeering
tends to afford states greater regulatory control than does preemption.20
I ask my students whether they are persuaded by Justice Breyer’s analysis of
relative regulatory control,21 and if so, whether his arguments sound not only
in public policy but also in constitutional law. The Court’s anticommandeering decisions do not discuss the importance of state regulatory control to the
values advanced by federalism. Instead, the Court has justified its categorical
ban on commandeering by stressing the importance of clear vertical divisions
of authority and political accountability.22 Regardless of whether one believes
that the Court’s holdings in this area are correct, transnational perspectives
from the European Union and Germany can inform a more comprehensive
class discussion of the various constitutional values potentially at stake.
An Individual Rights Example: Substantive Due Process
Turning from constitutional structure to individual rights, I ask my students
to consider the fact that many European countries restrict access to abortion to
a much greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed to date,23 yet
18.

See id. at 213-14, 230-31.

19.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

20.

See, e.g., Halberstam, Comparative Federalism, supra note 10, at 247 (noting that “the
anti-commandeering rule might have perverse effects, by prodding the central government to develop the bureaucracy necessary to implement its policy without involving the
component States”).

21.

For further discussion, see Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006).

22.

In New York v. United States, for example, Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court that “where
the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and
federal officials is diminished” because “it may be state officials who will bear the brunt
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program
may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.” New York v.
U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

23.

In the recent juvenile death-penalty case, see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text, Justice Scalia underscored the Court’s inattention to the international community’s greater
tolerance of restrictions on abortion:
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these communities provide more explicit and robust protection of other privacy
rights. Germans, for instance, enjoy protection of personal “dignity” (Article 1)
and the “right to the free development of…personality” (Article 2), together with
provisions protecting the “[p]rivacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications”
(Article 10) and the “[i]nviolability of the home” (Article 13), in their Constitution.24 This is a more extensive right to privacy than Americans possess, particularly because the right has been used to protect personal data and privacy from
invasions by the press and market.25
The point of the example is not to suggest any inconsistency within the
European view. Rather, the purpose is to underscore a strong contrast with
U.S. constitutional law. This contrast encourages U.S. students to consider
whether cases like Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey necessarily follow from a broad conception of privacy rights, or whether
the government’s interest in protecting a fetus suffices to distinguish the abortion question from other privacy issues of constitutional moment. To facilitate
this discussion, I inform my students that the West German Constitutional
Court declared unconstitutional a statute protecting abortion rights around
the same time as Roe.26
In addition, the abortion comparison helps to clear the ideological air by
illustrating that appeals to transnational legal perspectives can be used to advance both liberal and conservative constitutional commitments. To consider
another example, Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked the Dutch experience
with assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg to support the Court’s rejection
of a fundamental-rights claim in that case.27 And in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
And let us not forget the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, which makes us one
of only six countries that allow abortion on demand until the point of viability. Though the Government and amici in cases following Roe v. Wade…urged
the Court to follow the international community’s lead, these arguments fell
on deaf ears.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
24.

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, available at <http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/
docs/german.htm> (last visited June 20, 2006).

25.

See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 139, 186 (“The German
courts have decided several cases addressing the balance between the right to ‘informational
self-determination’ and ‘freedom of the press.’ The courts’ analysis, of course, depends upon
a constitutional context quite different from ours: the privacy right is expressly protected by
the German Constitution and applies to relationships among citizens, not simply between
the citizen and the state.”).

26.

See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 1, 6 (1994) (citing 39 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [First Senate] 1.42 (F.R.G.) (1975), translated in 9
J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 551, 605-84 (1976)).

27.

521 U.S. 702, 734-35 (1997). Glucksberg illustrates the practice of looking overseas to consider
the consequences of a particular rule in order to determine whether the rule is consonant with
relevant constitutional values. Glucksberg also underscores the care with which such looking
abroad should be conducted: the Glucksberg Court’s account of the Dutch experience has not
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Department of Health, he underscored that not only “the States,” but “indeed, all
civilized nations…demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as
a serious crime.”28
Entrenchment Provisions
One more example of comparison that I include in my course warrants
brief mention here: entrenchment provisions. The U.S. Constitution is deeply
entrenched in its difficulty of amendment, as evidenced by the fact that only
seventeen amendments (beyond the Bill of Rights) have been ratified in more
than two hundred years. By contrast, some nations—and some states in the
United States—have constitutions that are easier to amend.29 Moreover, Article
V of the U.S. Constitution immunizes little from modification via amendment:
only certain now-inoperable slavery provisions and the entitlement of states to
equal representation in the Senate. But some other nations have more in their
constitutions that cannot be changed.30 I invoke these facts towards the beginning of my course so that students will consider why constitutional change
is designed to be more difficult than legislative change, and what an optimal
Article V provision might provide in light of its animating purposes.
International Law and Foreign Experiences in the “War on Terror”
Beyond serving as fodder for comparisons to legal practices in other countries, transnational perspectives also inform my teaching of judicial decisions
in the “war on terror.” In covering cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld31 and Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,32 which implicate questions of statutory interpretation in addition to
constitutional law,33 I expose my students to some of the international law of
been replicated here. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 912-13 (2006).
28.

497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (emphasis added).

29.

Both the Indian Constitution and the (unwritten) constitution of the United Kingdom may
be amended by a simple majority of the legislature. Robert L. Maddex, Constitutions of
the World 159, 372 (2d ed., Wash., D.C., 2001). Additionally, several U.S. states—including
Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, and Massachusetts—require only a simple majority vote
in the legislature to amend their constitutions. Robert L. Maddex, State Constitutions of
the United States xxxii - v (Wash., D.C., 2006).

30.

In Brazil, for example, no amendment may abolish the federal form of government, the
direct, secret, universal, periodic vote, the principle of separation of powers, or individual
rights and guarantees. Maddex, Constitutions of the World, supra note 29, at 52. In Chad,
amendments may not be proposed if they interfere with territorial integrity, independence,
national unity, the republican form of government, the division of powers and security,
the freedoms and fundamental rights of citizens, or political pluralism. Id. at 69. Germany
prohibits amendments to the first twenty articles of its constitution and any change to the
constitution that would affect the division of the federation into states or state participation
in legislation. Id. at 132.

31.

542 U.S. 507 (2004).

32.

126 S. Ct. 2749, 2006 WL 1764793.

33.

Statutory interpretation and constitutional law are related because, among other reasons, the
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war and the Geneva Conventions. Justice O’Connor’s controlling plurality
opinion in Hamdi relies heavily upon a particular understanding of the law
of war in concluding that Congress had authorized the president’s indefinite
detention of a citizen who was an alleged enemy combatant:
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States
in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals
Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention
of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental
and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President to use.34

Justice Souter’s opinion in Hamdi also makes extensive use of the law of war.
He, however, comes to an opposite conclusion from the plurality on the question of congressional authorization because he found that the government appeared not “to be acting in accordance with customary law of war and hence
to be within the terms of the [AUMF] in its detention of Hamdi”:
By holding him incommunicado… , the Government obviously has not been
treating him as a prisoner of war, and in fact the Government claims that no
Taliban detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status. This treatment appears
to be a violation of the Geneva Convention provision that even in cases of
doubt, captives are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war “until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” The Government answers that the President’s determination that Taliban detainees do not
qualify as prisoners of war is conclusive as to Hamdi’s status and removes any
doubt that would trigger application of the Convention’s tribunal requirement. But reliance on this categorical pronouncement to settle doubt is apparently at odds with the military regulation adopted to implement the Geneva
Convention, and setting out a detailed procedure for a military tribunal to
determine an individual’s status.…35
outcome of an exercise in statutory construction can determine whether the court must decide a constitutional issue. In Hamdi, for example, the plurality avoided the question whether
the president possessed inherent Article II power to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants by holding that Congress had authorized the President’s actions. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
516-17.
34.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (referencing the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), which authorizes the president to use “all necessary
and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). Justice O’Connor also wrote, among other things, that
“[t]here remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an
appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.” Id. at 538 (citing Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, §§ 1–6 (1997)). Army Regulation 190-8 was adopted to implement the Geneva
Convention. It specifies the procedures that administrative military tribunals must follow in
determining a detainee’s prisoner-of-war (POW) status. See id.

35.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549-51 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
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In Hamdan, moreover, the Court embraced the position that the Government
was not complying with the law of war upon which it was allegedly relying in
seeking to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by military commission.36
One cannot successfully teach these cases without exposing students to the relevant federal statutes, Geneva Convention provisions, and military regulations
implementing them.
Such knowledge is also useful in introducing students to other controversial actions that the Executive Branch has defended, at least in part, by invoking the same federal statute at issue in Hamdi and Hamdan—namely, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). Of particular relevance is
the National Security Agency’s program of warrantless domestic spying. The
international law of war does not decisively resolve such legal questions, which
turn primarily on issues of statutory construction. But the law of war provides
a frame of reference that informs legal arguments about what Congress reasonably can be understood to have intended when it drafted a law authorizing the
president to use military force.37
Not only is international law important in U.S. constitutional litigation, but
the experiences of other nations in dealing with terrorism are also relevant in
evaluating the strength of the interests asserted by the government in court.
The United States is less experienced at confronting issues involving the detention and interrogation of terror suspects than is, for example, the United
Kingdom and Israel.38 The United States is thus more appropriately situated
in judgment) (referencing Army Regulation 190-8, §§ 1-5, 1-6).
36.

A federal district court adopted Justice Souter’s reasoning in Hamdi and applied it to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004)
(Robertson, J.). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
holding among other things that Congress had authorized the military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay, the Geneva Conventions gave detainees no right to enforce the treaty’s
provisions in court, and the Guantanamo military commissions satisfied the “competent
tribunal” requirement of Army Regulation 109-8. 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Supreme
Court recently reversed on the ground that the military commissions violated Articles 21 and
36(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 821 and 836(b), as well as Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court held that Common Article 3 applies
to the conflict with al Qaeda and controlled the litigation because Article 21 conditions the
President’s authority to use military commissions on his compliance with the law of war, and
the Conventions are incontrovertibly part of the law of war.

37.

In discussing international law, I flag for students a potentially significant difference between
its role—especially treaties—and the relevance of transnational materials generally. International law may impose direct, rather than merely interpretive, restraints on the Executive.
See U.S. Const. art. VI (including treaties as part of “the supreme Law of the Land”). I also
note to students that international law normally does not have constitutional status—for
example, Congress can override treaties—but can acquire this status if it is incorporated in
constitutional interpretation.

38.

See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Comparative Law Scholars and Experts on the Laws of the
United Kingdom and Israel in Support of Respondent, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 03-1027 (filed
Apr. 12, 2004), at 3 (stressing “how dramatically the indefinite, incommunicado detention to
which Petitioner has subjected Jose Padilla departs from the minimum procedural protections
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to learn the lessons of their history, rather than the other way around. And
with some such exposure to the trials, tribulations, and resulting policies of
other nations, law students are better able to evaluate the Executive Branch’s
current claims of national security and military necessity.39
The Supreme Court’s Invocations of Foreign Legal Practices
Finally, the debate among the Justices themselves regarding the citation
of foreign legal sources, both in their opinions and beyond,40 has made it
important to consider the relevance of transnational legal perspectives in
teaching foundational issues of constitutional authority and interpretation.
Among other questions, I address the following points with my students
when covering various approaches to reading the Constitution.41
It is not clear what independent work, if any, the majority’s invocations
of foreign legal authority are doing in the majority opinions in Atkins v. Virginia,42 Lawrence v. Texas,43 and Roper v. Simmons.44 In Roper, for example, Justice
Kennedy explained for the Court that “[i]t is proper that we acknowledge
that other democracies provide detained suspected terrorists”); H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm.
Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (prohibiting
aggressive methods of interrogating terror suspects because they had not been legislatively
authorized).
39.

The experiential resources discussed in the text constitute more than policy considerations;
they inform the doctrinal tests articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional cases.
See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (“Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)] dictates that
the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that
will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including
the function involved’ and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater
process. 424 U.S. at 335. The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of
these concerns, through an analysis of ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of the private interest if the process were reduced and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
safeguards.’” Id.).

40.

On January 13, 2005, Justices Scalia and Breyer met at American University’s Washington
College of Law in Washington, D.C. to discuss whether the U.S. Supreme Court should cite
foreign judicial decisions in its opinions. Their conversation has since been published. See
Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const.
L. 519 (2005).

41.

Because I do not cover the death penalty in my course, I expose my students to this material towards the beginning of the semester, when I teach different theories of constitutional
interpretation.

42.

536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded persons is prohibited
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).

43.

539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas law making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).

44.

543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the execution of persons who were under eighteen years
of age at the time they committed their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
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the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death
penalty,” and that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions.”45 He added that “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”46 It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy is implying that the opinion of
the world community could also disconfirm a constitutional conclusion that
the Court would otherwise accept. It is also not clear why the Court seems to
invoke foreign legal authority selectively—that is, regarding only certain legal
questions and from only certain countries. One might further query why the
same transnational comparisons do not “simply underscore[]” how We the
People are different from the rest of the world—that is, how America’s “present-day self-definition and national identity”47 compel distinct resolutions of
similar legal problems.
At the same time, those who criticize the Court’s citations to foreign legal
authority in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper may not have persuasively explained
why their objections do not apply with similar force when the Justices cite law
review articles, the Bible, or even lower court decisions. All are employed as
forms of persuasive authority, nothing more.48 It may be a stretch to distinguish foreign judicial decisions from other sources by suggesting that reliance
on decisions from non-American courts will facilitate “judicial activism” and
“making it up” in ways that the other sources cannot.49
Accordingly, I ask students whether the objections sound primarily in
methodological concerns or in substantive disagreement with the Court’s
conclusions in these cases. To those who agree with the Court’s critics, I
45.

Id. at 578.

46.

Id. at 578.

47.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.

48.

See Ginsburg, A Decent Respect, supra note 8:
Judges in the United States are free to consult all manner of commentary—Restatements, Treatises, what law professors and even law students write copiously in law
reviews, for example. If we can consult those writings, why not the analysis of a question similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion of the Supreme Court of
Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German Constitutional Court,
or the European Court of Human Rights?… Foreign opinions are not authoritative;
they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But they can add to the store of
knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions.

49.

Compare, e.g., the Scalia/Breyer Discussion, supra note 40, at 530-31 (Scalia: “It invites manipulation. You know, I want to do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have
to write something that—you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to cite something.”)
with id. (Breyer: “But if you are not conscientious, why become a judge? What would be
the pleasure or reward in entering a profession that prizes integrity, honesty, doing the job
properly?”).
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inquire why Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Glucksberg and Cruzan
never caused a legal and political controversy about the Court’s reliance
on foreign legal perspectives and experiences. I also ask whether a similar
tumult would have ensued if the Court had looked across the Atlantic in
using Casey to overrule Roe. There is rich material here for class discussions about the legitimacy of the Court’s uses of non-U.S. law in deciding
controversial constitutional cases.
Putting aside the politics of constitutional law and questions of consistency,
this debate within and beyond the Court focuses the attention of students on
theories of constitutional interpretation. I challenge my students to consider
which accounts of the legitimate exercise of judicial review render foreign judicial decisions relevant to U.S. constitutional law. Specifically, I suggest that
the controversy over citing foreign legal authority raises profound questions
for the view that the meaning of the Constitution changes over time.50 To what
extent does the authority of the Constitution as ethos—as an evolving instantiation of collective identity51—encompass not just a consensus on contemporary
American values, but on values of the world as well? Why should or should
not “[t]he opinion of the world community” provide a criterion for constitutional judgment? Whatever one’s answer to these questions, transnational
legal perspectives facilitate their formulation. By asking such questions to my
students, I focus their attention on the nature and legitimate scope of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review in constitutional cases.
Conclusion: A Cautionary Note
For the reasons explored above, I believe it is important to expose students
in my introductory course in U.S. constitutional law to transnational legal perspectives. Indeed, I respectfully appeal to casebook authors to include more
transnational material so that instructors are better able to teach it. I also think
it is important, however, not to overstate the case for transnational perspectives in teaching a first-year course in constitutional law. Although I support
the general enterprise, I avoid comprehensive transnational comparisons in
class, just as I have resisted claims of pedagogical necessity in this essay. In my
judgment, a first-year course in U.S. constitutional law appropriately focuses
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review in constitutional cases,
as well as on the constitutionally relevant conduct of other federal and state
50.

See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“that our understanding of the
Constitution does change from time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed
life into its text”). Questions about the proper use of transnational perspectives are analytically separable from debates about the meaning of the U.S. Constitution as fixed absent
amendment or evolving regardless of amendment. But for proponents of an evolving
Constitution, the issue arises whether (and why) this evolution should be responsive to
transnational legal perspectives.

51.

See generally, Robert C. Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in Robert Post,
Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 23-50 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1995).
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officials. The transnational dimension, in other words, constitutes a relatively
minor part of my overall course.
Of course, times change and so does the content of U.S. constitutional law.
Transnational perspectives arguably matter more today than in times past.
Globalization continues to make the world a smaller place, the U.S. Supreme
Court confronts the legal limits of presidential power in the “war on terror,”
and the Justices themselves are invoking (or criticizing invocations of) foreign
legal authority.
But in a survey course in U.S. constitutional law, class time remains a scarce
resource and coverage tradeoffs must be negotiated with discipline. Moreover,
U.S. constitutional law is a difficult subject for beginning law students to master when studied on its own terms. Routinely adding other legal systems to
the course discussion can cultivate confusion, not clarity. Finally, and most
importantly, teachers who are not comparative constitutional lawyers must
confront the daunting reality that it is difficult to construct transnational examples that are both intellectually serious and pedagogically tractable.52 One
must proceed with care, lest a little knowledge become a dangerous thing and
one’s students conclude that they are competent to make useful comparisons
without serious study of other legal systems and comparative constitutional
law.53 I therefore suggest that transnational legal perspectives are best cast in a
modest, supporting role in introductory courses in constitutional law.

52.

See Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparitive Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at
671 (“[T]he task of incorporating non-national material in a nationally oriented course is not
an easy one. Facile comparisons are easy; serious ones difficult. Differences in culture, in
legal traditions, and in institutional arrangements other than the one being compared at the
moment all require great caution in suggesting to U.S. law students that they can become
better lawyers by knowing a little bit about non-U.S. law.”). Yet comparativists might take
care not to scare off U.S.-centered teachers by setting impossibly high standards regarding
what counts as a responsible transnational comparison. There is a middle ground, one that
requires some (but not extensive) transnational expertise on the part of the instructor and
that results in illuminating pedagogical comparisons.

53.

I am also concerned that teaching a little transnational law in U.S.-centered courses might
sap the desire of law faculties to hire comparative lawyers who specialize in teaching comparative law. Such an outcome would be unfortunate, an inexpensive but insufficiently
considered way out of the implications of globalization for legal education. The solution is
not to minimize student exposure to transnational perspectives in first-year courses, but to
continue hiring comparative legal scholars.

